France and Britain, for so long the very epitome of European Imperial power, now face the prospect of a shared military in order to deal with financial crises and their ongoing decline from superpowers to sub powers.

Oh, how the mighty have fallen! Just a century ago the two countries’ individual military might was there for all to see as naval vessels waltzed through oceans overseeing vast lands of colonial power. The colonies are gone; the empires vanquished and France and Britain have struggled to find a new role in a rapidly changing world.

It appears David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy have decided that any role for either country should rely on that of the other. Last week’s strategic defence review hardly signalled a government offensive against the armed forces but it will largely reduce the capability of our Air Force and Navy. All week satirists have fed off the prospect of an aircraft carrier yet to be built which won’t even carry an aircraft before it is mothballed in three years time. Our navy, once a dominating technological giant, is now humiliatingly impotent.

In such circumstances the old enemy across the channel comes as a strategic help rather than hindrance. Think tanks in both countries are discussing the prospect of sharing expertise as well as technology. As the two largest defence spenders in the EU the feeling is that, due to financial concerns, the countries would rather run a three-legged arms race than carry on running independently. Air forces and navies (including air craft carriers) could cooperate; military training could be shared and there is even talk of a mutual nuclear deterrent.

It sounds like a europhile’s dream wherein Britain finally embraces Europe with open arms. However, such cooperation has long been necessary rather than contingent. Whether it is because of our shared outlook or our geographical proximity, President Sarkozy is right when he says that ‘‘there can be no situation in which the vital interests of either [country]...can be threatened...without the other being threatened’’.

The truth is that an Anglo-Franco military alliance should have already existed for 40 years but for the one historical event which, more than any other, awoke both countries to their post-imperial insignificance. The Suez crisis of 1958 dramatically diverged France and Britain’s respective military outlooks. France opted for autonomous control of their military, in the process removing themselves from the military command of NATO; while Britain cosied up to what was thought to be our big brother America. Since then Britain has gone from being America’s international partner to sidekick to, most recently, puppy dog.

In that period, mainly as a result of Foreign policy disagreements, France and Britain have failed to come together again despite their understanding that national and international interests require that they do so. In the early 1970s Ted Heath, having brought Britain into the EU, tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a shared nuclear deterrent with Georges Pompidou. Tony Blair held positive talks with Jacques Chirac on the same issue before Iraq divided their opinions.

Most recently in March Sarkozy, having restored France to NATO’s military command, offered to discuss the subject with Gordon Brown before Brown decided that the issue would be too controversial in an election year.

Now it seems that the coalition Government (perhaps with a pro-Europe Lib Dem or two muscling in) are beginning to come round to the idea of an agreement which, if bold enough, would cut military expenses dramatically and bring Britain out of its North Sea cold with regards to Europe.

Such a move should be welcomed as it represents a significant step for future British diplomacy. On various levels the independence of our defence will be lost, but it is the effect that Anglo-Franco agreements could have on our ‘‘offense’’ policy which could prove vital. The interconnectivity of our future military with France would act as a crucial buffer to any eccentric interventionist policies future governments could hold.

If the proposed deal of sharing resources had been agreed between Chirac and Blair, Britain may never have gone to war in Iraq and, as Donald Rumsfeld said himself, we didn’t need to anyway. Our foreign policy should be robustly tied to that of international institutions. France and the EU would be a good place to start.

Britain has for too long remained in the neoconservative shadow of the USA hoping to deal with the withdrawal symptoms of losing our empire. What lies in our more immediate national interest is on the other side of the Channel. As Etienne de Durand of the French Institute of International Relations said on the issue of Anglo-Franco military sharing: ‘‘It’s about being sex buddies rather than marriage’’.

Perhaps marriage would be too much of a commitment for the British people but, for now, sleeping with the enemy may be just the solution that Britain needs to fix its ailing defence budget.