After nearly 10 years as the Ivorian opposition leader to the rule of Laurent Gbagbo, and following four months of post election strife, Alassane Ouattara is finally able to take on the role of president of Ivory Coast, an office internationally accepted to legally belong to him following disputed elections in November 2010. But what an unenviable office it is.

Ivory Coast used to be considered a decolonisation success. An economic power in the ’60s and ’70s, in the last 20 years Ivory Coast has been victim to one coup d’état and a brief yet significant civil war, which eff ectively split the country in two. Ouattara has inherited a country divided on religious grounds, economically crippled, suffering from humanitarian crises and one where militias of dubious allegiances hold power. Storming the presidential complex and capturing the incumbent Gbagbo was the easy part – the hard part is only beginning.

Although experiencing an increasing, though tentative, return to normality, with people back on the streets and businesses reopening, international analysts have expressed a fear that this is only a temporary lull in a larger sphere of unresolved politics. A successful resolution to the latent problems of Ivory Coast requires a number of simultaneous actions that maintain strong awareness of Ivory Coast’s troubled history, ethnic and religious divides that plague the nation, as well as an understanding of the role of big-man politics in Ivorian history.

Hundreds of thousands have fled their homes during the standoff  between forces loyal to Ouattara and Gbagbo, with an unknown number left dead. The most shocking reports of mass killings come from the western town of Duékoué; of particular concern are reports of the involvement of pro-Ouattara forces in these killings. Ouattara depends upon a moral authority for his leadership and such an implication can only harm his credentials and make the international community as well as his own people question his propriety as leader. It is critical that people be held accountable for crimes committed, and this must include forces loyal to Gbagbo as well as Ouattara himself. Ouattara has stated his desire to create a national reconciliation council, it is critical they have the power and will to investigate both sides.

Initial reticence on the part of Ouattara’s political elite to admit to the possibility that pro-Ouattara forces may have taken part in extra-judiciary killings has been quickly abated following news of internal fi ghting between militias loyal to Ouattara in the commercial capital of San Pedro. 

 is leads onto the next issue, the fact that Ouattara’s forces are a collection of rebel groups whose main alliance has been an opposition to Gbagbo’s rule. With the end of their unifying cause, splits in the group are becoming evident. As such the rebels must become demilitarised and the troops collected into a national army with national security rather than fractional loyalties at its core. 

 However, for this to become possible, Ouattara needs to tackle the deep seated discontent at the heart of the groups. Ouattara’s support mostly comes from the Muslim north of the country which has for a long time felt politically sidelined and dominated by the mostly Christian south who, by and large, are Gbagbo supporters. It cannot be forgotten that Gbagbo got over 45% of the vote. The split in the nation based upon religious lines lies in the politicising of this social diff erence by politicians following the nation’s independence from France in 1960. This divide led to the civil war of 2002-3 and the creation of the northern rebel groups. 

 By moving the government centre from Christian Abidjan in the south, from where Gbagbo has ruled, to the central and official capital of Yamoussoukro, equal political involvement of the Muslim north in the nation’s aff airs seems ostensibly probable. Yet, this is not enough and it now seems critical for Ouattara to create a broad-based inclusive government which represents the ethnic and religious diversity of the nation. Key positions in the government as well as the military need to be held by people who are representational of the nation.

It is only after the end of the conflict that in retrospect one is able to see the main impetus for post election strife in the country. The Ivorian Election Commission proclaimed Ouattara the winner of the November elections, yet abused its power by swearing him into office. The Constitutional Council, which has the power to swear in a president; also overstepped its power by re-inaugurating a losing incumbent. This left Ivory Coast with two leaders, an arrangement which could only ever have led to conflict. If Ivory Coast and the region are to learn anything from the recent strife it is the need for a higher independent judicial body with the power and mandate to resolve post election disputes. 

 Ouattara is now the head of a country in a perilous position, requiring post-strife reconciliation and social repair. Sorting out the internal strife that lies latent in the nation is a task that will not be accomplished easily. However he can begin by making sure that an election can never be disputed again and two presidents reign at once.